Byrd v. Philadelphia by unknown
2007 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-28-2007 
Byrd v. Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 
Recommended Citation 
"Byrd v. Philadelphia" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 535. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/535 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 06-3894
________________
HADDRICK BYRD,
Appellant
v. 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; JOHN STREET, Mayor; SYLVIA JOHNSON,
Police Commissioner; ALBERT PARIS, Retired Police Detective,
Badge #929; MARTIN BUCK, Retired Police Detective, Badge
#9071; MCCABE, Retired Police Detective, Badge #609; K.
CURCIO, Retired Police Detective, Badge #970; RYAN, Retired
Police Sergeant, Badge #8612; F. EMMETT FITZPATRICK, Former
District Attorney; LYNNE ABRAHAM, District Attorney; ROBERT SHANNON,
Superintendent; KOZAR, Records Supervisor; B. L. TRITT,
Corrections Classification Program Manager
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-01957 )
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 2, 2007
BEFORE: SLOVITER, McKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  August 28, 2007)
________________
OPINION
________________
     1  The District Court dismissed the state law claims without prejudice to allow Byrd to
transfer them to the state court. 
2
PER CURIAM
Haddrick Byrd appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights lawsuit.  For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
In 1975, a jury convicted Byrd of murder and robbery.  He was sentenced to a term
of life imprisonment plus a concurrent term of twenty years on the robbery charge.   In
1999, he sued various police detectives, defense attorneys, prosecutors and state and
federal judges alleging that his arrest, prosecution, convictions, and ensuing confinement
were illegal.  See Byrd v. Parris, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 99-00769 (“Byrd I”).  Specifically, his
complaint alleged violations of due process and equal protection rights, cruel and unusual
punishment, and state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment.  All of the federal
claims against all of the defendants were dismissed with prejudice because either the
defendants were entitled to immunity or the claims would be barred under Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).1  
In his complaint filed in 2006, Byrd alleges claims of false arrest and
imprisonment, involuntary servitude, fraud, denial of due process, denial of equal
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment, all stemming from his arrest, prosecution,
and confinement as a result of his convictions.  He seeks declaratory judgment, release
from confinement, and compensatory and punitive damages.   
3The District Court identified several grounds for dismissing Byrd’s lawsuit.  At the
outset, the District Court noted that Byrd’s present action is “nearly identical” to Byrd I,
the action he brought in 1999.  As a result, the court ultimately concluded that the issue
preclusion and claim preclusion doctrines serve as a bar to Byrd’s present lawsuit.  We
agree.  
Claim preclusion applies when there is a final judgment on the merits involving
the same parties or their privies and a subsequent suit based upon the same causes of
action.  United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984).  With
respect to the identity of causes of action, this Court has reasoned: “Rather than resting on
the specific legal theory invoked, res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims . . ..”  Id. at 983-
94 (citation omitted).  
Here, in both lawsuits, the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims
are undoubtedly the same: Byrd’s arrest, prosecution, and confinement for the murder and
robbery.  As the District Court noted, the acts complained of and the relief sought in the
cases are virtually the same; the theories of recovery are the same; the same witnesses and
documents would be necessary for both actions; and the material facts alleged are the
same.  See id.   
Furthermore, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) precludes the re-litigation of
issues where they have been actually litigated and determined adversely to the party or
their privies.  See New Jersey-Philadelphia Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church
     2  Byrd contends that he should be able to relitigate the false arrest and wrongful
confinement claims because the state court “has refused to rule on [them] until the
plaintiff is released from prison.”  (Appellant’s Brief, at A-11.)  These are state claims
that were permitted to be transferred to the state court in Byrd I.  Nothing that Byrd
argues in his brief with respect to these claims would justify the relitigating these issues. 
See Melikian, 791 F.2d at 277-78.
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v. New Jersey State Board of Higher Education, 654 F.2d 868, 876 (3d Cir. 1981).  This
also means that even if Byrd wanted to sue some different parties this time around, he is
precluded from doing so: “[i]f a party is precluded from relitigating an issue with an
opposing party, he is also precluded from doing so with another person unless he lacked a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or unless other
circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.”  Melikian v.
Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1986).  Byrd has not presented any such
circumstances that would justify allowing him to relitigate any of the issues from his first
action.2
Moreover, even if the principles of res judicata did not apply to Byrd’s lawsuit, the
statute of limitations would present an insurmountable bar to Byrd’s claims.  The statute
of limitations for any § 1983 claim is the forum state’s limitations statute for personal
injury actions.  See Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1094 (2007).  Here, the applicable
limitations period would be Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations on personal
injury actions.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.  Byrd was arrested thirty years ago
and clearly could have filed his lawsuit before now.  Wallace, 127 S. Ct. at 1095.  Byrd’s
attempt to argue that the continuing wrong doctrine applies to his situation is flawed; his
     3  We do not disagree with the other bases cited by the District Court for dismissal of
the lawsuit.  Given the conclusive bars of claim and issue preclusion, as well as the statute
of limitations, we need not address the rest of the Court’s analysis.  
5
recent letter-writing campaign to various officials cannot resurrect his defunct claims.3  
We will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Byrd’s complaint.
